In a recent paper, Fernandez (2004) argues that the present value effect of the tax saving on debt cannot be calculated as simply the present value of the tax shields associated with interest. This contradicts standard results in the literature. It implies that, even though the capital market is complete, value-additivity is violated. As a consequence, adjusted present value formulae of a standard sort cannot be used. Also, it implies that the value of the tax saving differs from conventional estimates by a considerable amount. We reconcile Fernandez' results with standard valuation formulae for the tax saving from debt. We show that, as one would expect, the value of the debt tax saving IS the present value of the tax savings from interest. The apparent violation of value-additivity in the Fernandez paper comes from mixing the Miles-Ezzell leverage policy with the Miller-Modigliani leverage adjustment.
Introduction
In a recent paper, Fernandez (2004) argues that the present value effect of the tax saving on debt cannot be calculated as simply the present value of the tax shields associated with interest. Rather, he claims that the only way to obtain the correct value of the tax shields from debt is to do two present value calculations, one for the unleveraged firm and the other for the leveraged firm, and then subtract the former from the latter. In an important application of this approach, he shows that the value of the tax saving from debt for a growing firm following the Miles-Ezzell (1980) policy of a constant leverage ratio is not equal to the constant growth valuation formula applied to next year's tax saving from interest, as one would expect. In fact, Fernandez claims that the value is potentially considerably greater than this, by a multiple that is the ratio of the required return on the assets of the unleveraged firm to the cost of debt for the leveraged firm.
These results are potentially important, because they contradict standard results in the literature. In particular, Fernandez claims that the approaches of Modigliani and Miller (1963), Myers (1974) , Miles and Ezzell (1980) , Harris and Pringle (1985) , Brealey and Myers (2000) , and Ruback (2002) are all flawed. In addition, the result implies that, even though the capital market is complete, value-additivity is violated because the value of a stream of cash flows (the tax saving from debt) is not independent of adding it to another set of cash flows (the cash flows from the unleveraged firm). As a consequence, adjusted present value formulae of a standard sort cannot be used. Finally, they imply that the value of the tax saving differs from conventional estimates by a considerable amount.
In this paper, we reconcile the Fernandez results with standard valuation formulae for the tax saving from debt. We show that, as one would expect in a complete market, the value of the debt tax saving IS the present value of the tax savings from interest. We show that the apparent violation of value-additivity in the Fernandez paper comes from mixing the Miles-Ezzell leverage policy with the Miller-Modigliani leverage adjustment. In the central case used by Fernandez, that of a growing firm following the Miles-Ezzell leverage policy, we show that the value of the tax saving from debt is equal to the constant growth valuation formula applied to next year's tax saving from interest, as one would expect.
Leverage policy and the value of the tax saving
Like Fernandez, we start with an unleveraged firm that generates stochastic cash flows which, in expectation, are an after tax growing perpetuity starting at F CF and growing at the rate g. There are no investor taxes, and the required return on the unleveraged equity is K U . The value of the unleveraged firm is:
The leveraged firm has equity value E and debt value D. We ignore costs of financial distress, so the value of the tax saving from debt, V T S, is defined as the difference between the enterprise value of the leveraged firm and the value of the unleveraged firm:
The two main approaches to leverage policy are the Modigliani and Miller (1963) (MM) and the Miles-Ezzell (1980) (ME) approaches. The difference is that ME assume that the amount of debt is adjusted to maintain a fixed market value leverage ratio, whereas MM assume that the amount of debt in each future period is set initially and not revised in light of subsequent developments.
The standard versions of the MM formulas apply to the case where there is no growth, so g = 0.
The ME case that is closest to the MM analysis is when g = 0. Even then, the ME leverage policy still differs from that assumed by MM. In particular, the ME policy generates future tax savings from interest that are proportional to the future value of the firm. The firm value varies over time because the cash flows are stochastic. For example, when g = 0 they may follow a random walk with no drift. In contrast, the MM policy, where the amount of leverage is set to a particular level and then not revised in light of later developments, generates a tax saving from interest that does not vary as the value of the firm varies.
Because the level of risk in the tax savings is very different, relationships between key parameters are different for the two assumed leverage policies. For the MM policy, the relationship between the cost of equity K E and K U is given by:
where T is the tax rate and K D is the cost of debt. For the ME leverage policy with continuous rebalancing, it is given by (see, for instance, Taggart (1991)): 1
Similarly, with the MM assumptions, the discount rate adjusted for the tax effect, is given by:
whereas, with the ME assumptions it is:
The value of the tax savings when the MM policy is followed is:
All the above are standard. The novel part of the Fernandez analysis is the derivation of the value of the tax saving for a growing firm pursuing the ME leverage policy. We now derive this value.
The leveraged firm generates the same operating free cash flow as the unleveraged firm. One way to value the leveraged firm is by using the tax-adjusted discount rate given by (5) or (6) to discount the unleveraged cash flows. An alternative is to use (2), value the tax saving from debt directly and add it to the value of the unleveraged firm. Whichever approach is taken, we must be careful to specify from the outset whether we are using the MM or the ME leverage policy.
The assumption used by Fernandez in his analysis of growing perpetuities is that the leverage ratio is constant. This is the ME assumption. The value of the leveraged firm, using the ME formula (6) for K L is:
If the company had no leverage its value would be:
The value of the tax saving is the difference between these values:
1 These expressions are derived assuming that debt is riskless. The general case, assuming risky debt, is derived in Cooper and Nyborg (2004b) .
Thus, the value of the tax saving is the value of a growing perpetuity starting at DK D T , growing at g, with risk the same as the unlevered assets. This is exactly what we get if we value the tax saving directly. The first period tax saving is equal to the interest charge, DK D , multiplied by the tax rate. With the ME constant debt to value leverage policy, the tax saving changes at the same rate as the unleveraged cash flows, and the risk of the tax saving is the same as the risk of the firm.
Thus, if unleveraged cash flows are represented by a growing perpetuity, the tax saving is valued as a perpetuity starting at DK D T , growing at g, and discounted at K U .
We can contrast this with the value of the tax saving under the MM assumptions by setting g equal to zero. Then the value is:
In contrast, the value of the tax savings when the MM policy is followed is:
The ratio of the two values is
The difference here arises because the tax saving in ME is discounted at the required return on assets, whereas, in MM it is discounted at the required return on debt. MM does not represent simply the ME assumption with zero growth. It is a completely different financing strategy. Even with cash flows that are expected to be perpetuities, the MM and ME assumptions differ. MM assume that the amount of debt will not change, regardless of whether the actual outcome of the risky perpetuity is higher or lower than its expected value, whereas ME assume that it will rise and fall in line with the expected cash flow.
Comparison with the Fernandez result
Fernandez examines exactly the same firm as we analyzed in the previous section. In contrast to (10) he derives a value for the tax saving under the ME financing strategy of: 2
This equation differs from (10) in that the growing perpetuity being valued does not start at a level of DK D T , the tax saving in the first period, but rather at the higher value of DK U T .
Fernandez' value of the tax saving under the ME assumptions with constant growth is a factor of (K U /K D ) times ours. The difference is substantial, because this ratio could be as much as two or more, depending on the levels of interest rates, equity risk premia, and asset betas.
The reconciliation of the two results lies in the assumption that Fernandez makes in setting the limit of relationships derived under the ME assumptions. Although he assumes that the leverage ratio is constant, he uses (12) as V T S when g is zero. The problem is that (12) assumes an MM financing strategy. Under the ME constant leverage ratio policy, V T S is actually given by (11) when g is zero. The ratio between this and the value assumed by Fernandez is
the ratio between his value of the tax saving for the growing firm and ours. The Appendix gives the details of the source of this confusion.
Relationship to other results
In general, the value of the leveraged firm including the tax effect of debt is the unlevered value plus the present value of the tax savings from debt: 3
where E(.) is the expectations operator, I t is the interest payment at date t, T t is the tax that will be saved at date t per dollar of interest charges, and K T S (t) is the discount rate appropriate to the tax saving at date t. In order to use this equation in practice, we must estimate three things: (i) the unlevered value, (ii) the discount rate for the tax shield, and (iii) the expected net tax saving from interest deductions in each future period.
The approaches of Modigliani and Miller (1963) , Myers (1974) , Miles and Ezzell (1980), Harris and Pringle (1985) , Brealey and Myers (2000) , and Ruback (2002) make different assumptions about some or all of the assumptions that underlie this expression, including the level of risk of the cash flows of the unlevered firm, the rate of growth of these cash flows, and the financing strategy. 4 However, all satisfy the basic relationship (14), as they should in a complete capital market.
In a recent paper, Fernandez (2004) claims to demonstrate that the present value effect of the tax saving on debt cannot be calculated as simply the present value of the tax shields associated with interest. This contradicts standard results in the literature. It implies that, even though the capital market is complete, value-additivity is violated. As a consequence, adjusted present value formulae of a standard sort cannot be used. Also, it implies that the value of the tax saving differs from conventional estimates by a considerable amount.
In this paper, we reconcile the Fernandez results with standard valuation formulae for the tax saving from debt. We show that, as we would expect in a complete market, the value of the debt tax saving IS the present value of the tax savings from interest. We show that the apparent violation of value-additivity in the Fernandez paper comes from mixing the Miles-Ezzell leverage policy with the Miller-Modigliani leverage adjustment.
where F CF 0,t is what the enterprise cash flow would be without taxes at date t (i.e. EBITD t ). We see that T axes L,t is proportional to ECF t if and only if D t = D t−1 = D (the MM policy). In that case, G L is as claimed by Fernandez. Using the result that the value of taxes for the unleveraged firm is G U = T V U /(1 − T ), one then arrives at the result that V T S = G U − G L = DT . When D t 6 = D t−1 , it is much harder to put a value on G L , since taxes are no longer proportional to equity flows. One case that can be solved is when D t /V t is constant (the ME financing policy). In this case, when g = 0 and the time between refinancing goes to zero,
. We then have that:
This is our equation (11).
